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1. INTRODUCTION 
For over a century, governments around the world have sought to boost and exploit the 
economic power of their particular regions and zones by designating them as „special‟ or 
„free‟ economic zones. This trend has gained momentum in the last four or five decades 
with the number of zones proliferating in recent years.  According to ILO estimates, by 
2006 there were 3,500 zones in 123 countries accounting for 60 million direct jobs and in 
excess of $400 billion total trade (ILO, 2003 and 2007). 
Iran‟s interest in free zones can be traced back to the 1970s when the potential 
development of Kish Island as a flagship free trade zone in the Persian Gulf was first 
advocated.  
After the end of the war with Iraq and with economic reconstruction under way in the late 
1980s, first concrete steps were taken – under the auspices of the First Five Year 
Development Plan – to realise this objective. In this first wave, three so-called „Free 
Trade-Industrial Zones‟ (FTZS, hereafter) were announced in the two Gulf Islands of 
Kish and Qeshm in the south, with a third one in Chahbahar (also in the south but on the 
littoral of  Sea of Oman). After about a decade and a half, another three FTZs have been 
established: two in the north (Aras and Anzali) in the proximity of the CIS states, with 
another (Arvand) in the south, bordering Iraq and Kuwait. 
This initiative was followed up with the setting up of 15 „Special Economic Zones‟ (SEZ 
hereafter) dispersed throughout Iran. Whilst, the FTZs are more ambitious in their 
objective of acting as magnets for the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
ultimately for generating a diversified industrial base and promoting Iran‟s non-oil 
exports, the SEZ are conceived for goods transit and improving the supply and 
distribution networks in the country. A new generation of SEZs have indeed been 
introduced with „special themes‟ (such as petrochemicals, shipping, minerals, gas, etc).  
Given the relatively recent history of many of the zones in Iran – and serious lack of 
available information – it is probably too early to fully evaluate the performance and 
impact of these zones as yet.  What evidence is available, however, highlights a mixed 
picture and a challenging start for many of the zones. For instance, even Kish Island – 
arguably the most successful of Iran‟s Zones – is better known for its success in 
developing as a centre of domestic trade and commerce rather than as an export platform. 
Attracting FDI and jobs creation on a significant scale no doubt remain the major 
challenges for all Iranian zones and only a critical and constructive reappraisal of the 
schemes can help identify some of these challenges in the years to come. 
Some of these challenges apply at the micro level – i.e. the design, operation and 
management of the zones themselves. However, we argue that the macro picture is also 
critical to the ultimate success of these. With growing regional competition over 
attracting foreign capital, Iran‟s zones can be at a disadvantage if policies pursued there 
are largely decoupled from, and at odds with, those in the mainland. Streamlining both 
sets of policies – in the zones and the mainland – and giving a consistent signal to 
investors – domestic and foreign alike – will be critical to enabling Iran to exploit its 
undoubted strategic potential as a major regional economic powerhouse.  
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2. THE RISE OF FREE ZONES  
The introduction of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
1
 has 
featured as key components of many developing countries‟ outward-oriented policies in 
the last few decades. This trend has been justified in several ways. First, free zones are 
considered by host countries as magnets for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and are considered as an essential plank of the strategy to promote manufactured exports 
and achieve long term economic diversification and growth.  Second, for countries with 
high unemployment, free zones are seen as spearheads for job creation helping to reduce 
unemployment both in regional and national contexts. Third, another – albeit implicit – 
appeal of the zones has been that setting them up represents partial reform and a more 
acceptable substitute for complete liberalisation (Miyagiwa, 1993; Madani, 1999). 
According to the ILO statistics, the number of countries with Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs) has risen steadily since the mid-1970s. By 2006, 130 countries were estimated to 
have set up a variety of different types of free zones (up from 27 only in 1975). The 
number of these zones likewise rose from a handful (79) to reach 3,500 in the same 
period. In the decade 1997-2006 alone, job creation in these zones trebled to reach a total 
of 66 million. Of these almost two-thirds (40 million) were accounted for by China (see 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1: EPZs: Estimates of Countries, Numbers and Employment, 1975-2006  
 
Source: ILO (2007), p. 1. 
 
 
Table 2 shows that despite the heavy concentration of EPZs in Asia in general and China 
in particular (three-quarters of global EPZ employment is located in Asia with China 
taking a lion‟s share of 60% of the total), free zones are well-established globally and not 
just limited to the developing world. The US and European EPZs indeed account for 
about three-quarters of a million jobs in total (about 1% of the total). Elsewhere, EPZs are 
preponderant in Latin America & the Caribbean with 6.3 million jobs and the Transition 
economies with another 1.4 million jobs.  
Such aggregate employment figures conceal a much greater significance of EPZs in job 
creation. First, their employment contribution goes well beyond the direct jobs they 
create as they create and support indirect jobs in a range of ancillary sectors. For instance, 
                                                 
1
 For a typology of different types of free zones, see Akinci and Crittle (2008), p. 10. 
 1975 1986 1997 2002 2006 
Number of countries with EPZs  25 47 93 116 130 
Number of EPZs or similar types of zones  79 176 845 3,000 3,500 
Employment (millions)  
– of which China  
– of which other countries with figures 
available 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.8 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.9 
22.5 
18 
4.5 
43 
30 
13 
66 
40 
26 
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it is estimated that if taking into account the indirect employment effects, EPZ 
development globally could embrace from 9.6 million to 77 million additional jobs 
(Akinci and Crittle, 2008, p. 34). Second, in some small island economies (such as 
Mauritius) small absolute numbers conceal the disproportionate contribution of EPZs to 
total local employment generation. Moreover, in some countries (such as in the 
Caribbean and small Central American states) EPZs tend to be provide jobs mostly for 
the female workforce.
2
  
 
 
Table 2: Geographical Distribution of Export Processing Zones, 2006 
Geographical Area Employment % 
Number of 
Zones 
China 40,000,000 59.7 
900+ Asia (excl. China) 15,741,147 23.5 
Latin America 6,258,554 9.3 448 
Middle East & North Africa 1,686,749 2.5 115 
Sub-Saharan Africa 860,474 1.3 90+ 
United States 340,000 0.5 713 
Transition Economies 1,400,379 2.1 400 
Europe 364,818 0.5 50 
Others (Pacific & Indian Oceans) 328,642 0.5 15 
Total (estimated) 66,980,763 100.0 3500+ 
Source: ILO (2007), p. 2. 
 
Free zones have a long standing history in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region going back to the 1960s and 1970s.
3
 The majority of the MENA region zones are, 
however, free trade zones and act as trading platforms rather than manufacturing zones 
for the host countries. This has severely limited the economic contribution of the MENA 
zones (with the exception of zones in Egypt and Jordan, which have developed a 
manufacturing focus). Another exception is Dubai, where the government-developed 
Jebel Ali Free Zone has been established as a major regional distribution and logistics 
hub
4
 (Akinci and Crittle, 2008, pp. 28-29). Indeed, none of MENA‟s free zones feature in 
the top ten global zones ranked by employment size or export earnings.  
                                                 
2
 According to the ILO‟s free zone database, for instance, the following countries had the highest 
proportion of female employment in their EPZ operations in 2006: Jamaica 90%,  Nicaragua 90%, 
Bangladesh 85%, El Salvador 85%; Sri Lanka78%, Honduras 75%, Philippines 74%; Madagascar 71%, 
Republic of Korea 70%; and so on (ILO, 2007). 
3
 Egypt, Syria, Israel and Jordan, for instance, established government-run zones at about the same time 
that zones were first set up in the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan 
(Akinci and Crittle (2008), pp. 28. 
4
 Dubai has also pioneered the development of specialized zones, such as Internet City, Knowledge Village 
and Media City.  
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Table 3: Zone Development Rankings 
Employment (thousands) Exports (US$ millions) 
1. China  
50,000 
1. China  
$145,000 
2. Indonesia  
6,000 
2. Malaysia  
117,013 
3. Mexico  
1,300 
3. Hong Kong  
101,500 
4. Vietnam 
950 
4. Ireland 
82,500 
5. Pakistan 
888 
5. Czech Republic  
68,626 
6. United Arab Emirates  
552 
6. India  
49,000 
7. Philippines 
545 
7. Algeria  
39,423 
8. South Africa 
535 
8. Argentina 
36,478 
9. Thailand 
452 
9. Philippines 
32,030 
10. Ukraine 
387 
10. Rep. of Korea  
30,610 
  Source: Akinci and Crittle (2008), p. 27. 
 
 
The steady rise of the free zones since the mid-1960s has indeed reflected the developing 
countries‟ hopes of reaping lasting economic gains to generate employment, foster 
foreign exchange earnings and induce technology transfer.  These hopes have generally 
fuelled perceptions of FTZs as „engines of growth‟ deriving in turn from the belief that 
establishing an FTZ necessarily raises welfare in the host country.   
Almost three decades on and with a deeper understanding of the theory and practice of 
the zones, some of these early expectations have, however, come to be moderated. Three 
factors, in particular, have contributed to this process.  
First, from a theoretical stance, free-traders have questioned the zones‟ expected benefits 
contending that the welfare gains associated with preferential trade agreements in general 
and free trade zones in particular are second best compared to a policy of global free 
trade (Hamada, 1974).
5
  Accordingly, the formation of these areas can have an adverse 
impact on the world economy if trade diversion outweighs trade creation even if external 
tariffs are left unchanged (see Krugman, 1991, for a useful exposition of this). Although 
establishing the potential for trade diversion may be a matter for empirical investigation,
6
 
                                                 
5
 See Jacob Viner (1950) for a classic demonstration of the theory of the second best, where he shows a 
move to free trade between two countries that maintain their respective external tariffs with the rest of the 
world can actually leave them worse off. This is because liberalizing trade with only a subset of trading 
partners can lead to a situation where countries switch from a relatively lower cost producer to a higher cost 
producer. Thus „trade diversion‟ can potentially decrease welfare and result in a loss of world efficiency.   
6
 Krugman (1991) suggests that in practice trade diversion caused by preferential trade arrangements is 
unlikely to be large due to the fact that most countries tend to trade with their neighbouring countries (their 
so-called natural trading partners). 
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the expected welfare gains are therefore far from unambiguous and should be subject to 
specific cost-benefit analysis (Warr, 1989, p. 77).
7
 
A second contributory factor has been the realisation that some of the perceived benefits 
of the zones may not after all be lasting or sustainable in the long term.  For instance, the 
„footloose‟ nature of the FDI flows into EPZs means that foreign firms operating in free 
zones are highly mobile internationally with some leaving „an EPZ in one country often 
migrating to an EPZ in another, in which conditions are more favourable‟ (Warr, 1989, p. 
66).  
Similarly, preferential arrangements in place to lure FDI into special zones may prove to 
have a short shelf life: the end of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 2004, for 
instance, is thought to have had a severe impact on the EPZs in Mauritius. Between 2004 
and 2005, total employment in the EPZ sector fell by more than 10,000 workers (or 13.7 
per cent). Given the predominance of women in this sector, this had a disproportionate 
impact on them (Otobe, 2008, pp. 16-17 and p. 36).
8
  
In the same vein, if the host government extends preferential treatment it accords to EPZ 
firms to investors elsewhere in the country (such as extending the right to import 
intermediate goods free of duty to firms producing for export outside the free zones), this 
can undermine the advantages of EPZs operations, raising questions as to whether 
expensive special zones are „really necessary‟ in the first place (Warr, 1989, p. 85, 
contends that this was the case with Philippines, Malaysia, and Korea). A similar 
experience is thought to have affected the EPZs in China in 1991 (Graham, 2004).
9
  
A third factor mitigating the attractions of EPZs has to do with their „enclave‟ nature, 
which can purportedly limit their local benefits such as backward linkages (local 
purchase of raw materials) and the extent and cost of technology transfer.  Warr (1989, p. 
71), for instance, finds that in reality, local sourcing makes up no more than a third of the 
total purchase of raw materials.  As for the transfer of technology, many EPZ industries 
use technology that is universally available (e.g. labour intensive operations such as 
garment production). This contrasts with the high-tech industries (e.g. electronics), where 
technical know-how given to the locals is treated „like handing it to one‟s competitors‟. In 
other words, „know-how is not readily given away; it has to be purchased‟ (Warr, 1989, 
p. 75). 
 
                                                 
7
 See Akinci and Crittle (2008, pp. 32-4) and Madani (1999, pp. 22-55) for a cost-benefit framework for 
evaluating EPZs.  Warr (1989) offers an applied analysis of benefits and costs of EPZs in four Asian 
countries of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
8
 This was an acceleration of a trend which had started since 2001. Between 2001 and 2005 male 
employment fell from over 30,000 to 24,000 (21%), while female employment declined more substantially, 
from 61,000 to just over 41,000 (33%) (Otobe 2008,  pp. 16-17). 
9
 In 1991 China largely lifted the restrictions limiting export-related privileges to firms located in the SEZs, 
and other measures were taken to liberalize China‟s FDI policy. This increased dramatically the flow of 
FDI into China, leading to sceptics to ask whether the FDI benefits „could have been accelerated had the 
1991 liberalization occurred earlier‟ (Graham, 2004, p. 91). 
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In view of the above, it is perhaps not surprising that some of the earlier attractions of 
EPZs tend to wear off as economies mature. Nevertheless and despite the erosion of some 
of the initial optimism surrounding the establishment of EPZs, they continue to be 
popular to date as attested to by the rising trends seen above. For many developing 
countries, indeed, the zones are seen if not as spearheads for their globalisation strategy 
then as practical mechanism for their foray into the international arena. This perception 
seems to be summed up well by the World Bank that although „EPZs are a second-best 
solution compared with generalized country-wide reforms, but …where countrywide 
reforms are difficult to implement, they can be a useful weapon in the development 
arsenal‟ (quoted in Graham, 2004, p. 100).  
Iran‟s experience with the development of free trade and special economic zones seems 
to fit well into this perception of the zones.  
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF FREE ZONES IN IRAN – AN OVERVIEW  
Interest in setting up and operating SEZs in Iran may be traced back to the 1970s, when 
the potential of the Kish Island in the Persian Gulf was first mooted as a flagship trade 
zone in the south. However, uncertainties following the revolutionary upheaval after 1979 
and war with Iraq in the 1980s meant it was not for another two decades before interest in 
the subject was revisited. 
In the late 1980s, and with post-war reconstruction effort under way, the First Five-Year 
Development Plan (1989-93) laid down the foundation stones of the first „Free Trade-
Industrial Zones‟ (FTZs). Article 19, stipulated three such areas – all in Iran‟s southern 
shores: the two islands of Kish and Qeshm in the Persian Gulf, and Chahbahar at the far 
south eastern corner of the mainland bordering with the Sea of Oman (Table 4).  
 
 
Table 4: Iran’s FTZs 
 Established Area Location Nearby 
Countries 
International 
Borders 
1. Kish 1989 91 sq 
km 
Persian Gulf GCC states Gulf 
waterways 
2. Qeshm 1990 480 sq 
km 
Strait of 
Hormuz 
GCC states Gulf 
waterways 
3. Chahbahar  1991 140 ha Southeast  Pakistan, 
Oman, GCC 
Oman Sea 
waterways 
4. Aras 2003 97 sq 
km 
Northwest Azerbaijan, 
Armenia 
Nakhchivan 
5. Arvand 2004 173 sq 
km 
Southwest GCC states Iraq & 
Kuwait 
6. Anzali 2003 3200 ha North 
(Caspian Sea) 
CIS, Caucasus - 
Source: Iran‟s Free Trade-Industrial Secretariat website, http://www.freezones.ir/   
 
The momentum gathered pace after this with a number of other important steps following 
on. First, a High Council was set up in 1992 entrusted with regulatory oversight and 
management and operational responsibilities for these and future zones. One of the first 
priorities of the Council was to devise and ratify the laws and regulations that were to 
govern the operation of free zones. This task was completed by 1993/94.  By the end of 
the Plan period, therefore, all three zones had been established, marking 1993 as a 
watershed in Iran‟s quest for FTZs. Another three zones have joined ranks in more recent 
years, raising the total number to six. Two of the newly established zones – Aras and 
Anzali – are located in the north (the former in the northwest bordering the Republic of 
Nakhchivan, in proximity of Azerbaijan and Armenia; the latter on the shores of the 
Caspian Sea with good access to CIS states). The third one, Arvand, is in the 
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southwestern province of Khuzistan and shares international borders with Iraq and 
Kuwait (see Annex A for more detail).  
The economic context in which Iran‟s experience of FTZs originated deserves some 
attention. Given the isolationism of the post-revolutionary period as well as the ravages 
imposed by the war with Iraq during the harsh decade of the 1980s, these zones were 
clearly seen as attractive „back doors‟ to the global economy, whilst the vexed and wider 
question of Iran‟s position in the international economy itself could be deferred – 
awaiting the test of the time. The war years had been particularly harsh for their impact 
on starving the economy of imported consumer goods and industrial inputs and 
intermediate products. Whilst the benefits of FTZs were officially articulated in terms of 
their potential contribution to addressing Iran‟s endemic economic problems (widespread 
capital shortages, low productivity, run-down public resources, highly limited non-oil 
exports, low level technology and management skills levels and practices; see Section 2 
below), an unstated attraction of the zones was, no doubt, their potential contribution to 
alleviating Iran‟s appetite for imports at the time.   
The early zones were selected principally for their proximity to Iran‟s international 
waters in the south and were hence seen as gateways for and potential links to the wider 
international economy.  
The customs rules adopted for the zones, too, exacerbated the tendency for them to 
develop as import platforms for the mainland. These rules allowed domestic travellers to 
the zones to take back (import) goods with them onshore according to Iran‟s general 
customs and excise regulations (they were treated as imports from abroad). This practice 
had the inadvertent impact of encouraging their development as major centres of 
domestic tourism and leisure for the burgeoning domestic tourism. This was aided in turn 
by two factors. First, it became a major source of income as the Zone Authorities‟ 
revenues were limited to income from the sale of land and customs and excise duties they 
could charge on merchandise. Second, Iran‟s continued isolation limited possibilities for 
international tourism giving the zones an edge in attracting a growing number of 
domestic tourists.  Thus, in early years the zones became major conduits for imports of 
consumer goods which sprang up on the back of growing domestic tourism (this was 
especially notable in the early growth of the Kish Island; more on this in Section 5 
below).  This practice was however, contrary to the spirit of setting up FTZs as export 
platforms and was subsequently abandoned in 2003 when the three new zones mentioned 
above were set up (Zakeri, 2006: 3-4). 
Another important provision under the First Plan was the establishment of the so-called 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) throughout the country. But if facilitating access to 
imported goods was only partially important for setting up Iran‟s FTZs, it was an even 
more explicit motivation behind the establishment of SEZs. Even before the Revolution 
and in the heyday of the 1970s‟ oil-boom, various industrial units had experienced costly 
delays in sourcing their industrial inputs and intermediate products from abroad. To 
address this, special facilities had been set up by Tehran‟s Customs Office to facilitate 
importation and storage of such goods. The need for these was heightened in the 1980s 
with the disruptions caused by the Iraq War.  
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Article 20 of the First Five-Year Development Plan recognised the need for the so-called 
„protected customs areas‟ but introduced a two-pronged approach whereby the zones on 
the mainland were managed by the Customs and those on the shorelines were under the 
supervision of the Ports and Shipping Organisation.  
Under this Law, the first SEZ was established in Sirjan in 1992 (in the central province of 
Kerman to the north of Bandar Abbas) under the official title of „protected customs area‟. 
The status was later changed as Sirjan was officially designated as an SEZ. This was then 
followed by a second zone in Sarakhs on the old silk route connecting Iran‟s northeastern 
Khorasan province to the Central Asian states through a newly established railway line 
(Mashad-Sarakhs-Tajan). The number of SEZs in Iran steadily increased thereafter with a 
third one set up in the port of Anzali (which was later changed into an FTZ), and the 
fourth one was also in an existing FTZ area of Qeshm, embracing the non-FTZ areas of 
this island. The momentum gathered pace in 1997, when several new SEZs were added. 
Moreover, zones with a „special theme‟ were introduced with a new petrochemicals free 
zone established in Bandare Imam, followed by an energy SEZ (oil and gas) in Pars 
(1998), mining zone in Lorestan (1999), electronics in Yazd (1997) and shipping in 
Bushehr.  
There are currently a total of 15 SEZs in Iran (see Annex B for details). 
 
 
 
3.1 The Objectives of Free Trade and Special Economic Zones  
Free zones are generally set up with the following explicit or stated objectives: 
 
 To attract foreign direct investment  
 To contribute to job creation 
 To promote and diversify exports  
 To upgrade domestic technological capability, managerial skills and know-how 
 To regenerate deprived and stressed areas and regions.  
 
There may also be some implicit or unstated objectives such as:  
 
 To reduce anti-export bias while keeping protective barriers elsewhere in the 
economy intact 
 To act as experimental laboratories for trialling new policies and approaches (for 
instance, financial, legal and labour policies can be tested in these zones before 
considering their application elsewhere in the economy). (FIAS, 2006; Madani, 
1999). 
 
In Iran too, free zones have had both a policy and infrastructure rationale combining most 
of the above goals and objectives. As we shall see below (Section 3), the setting up of 
FTZs and SEZs involved packaging import and export duty exemptions, streamlined 
customs and administrative controls and procedures, a more liberal foreign exchange 
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policy and income tax incentives to boost their competitiveness and to reduce entry and 
operating costs for investing firms.  
For the Free Trade-Industrial Zones, in particular, the principal objective was to help 
reduce Iran‟s isolation from the international economy by attracting and promoting 
foreign direct and domestic investment to boost manufacturing exports. This is why they 
are carefully located in areas with good, strategic links with major waterways and key 
regional markets for Iran. This is seen as an important mechanism to enable Iran to 
develop its non-oil exports and to diversify the economy. 
The Special Economic Zones, however, are dispersed throughout the country and are 
expected to play a more active role in regional policy, for their potential role in 
revitalising designated regions, as well as in improving the country‟s distribution system 
and supply network. Given the physical size of Iran and its well-known problems with the 
supply and distribution of imported inputs and intermediate products, it is not surprising 
that the SEZ have the added attraction of facilitating transit goods and the industrial 
inventory system, whilst simultaneously generating income and revenue for the SEZ 
authorities and creating local jobs. 
 
 
3.2 Main Benefits and Attractions 
There is little doubt that Iran commands much economic and geo-political significance in 
the Middle East and is of immense interest on the international arena, too. This contrasts 
its external perceptions, which may generally depict it as a risky choice for international 
investment. 
Iran boasts a large land mass (three times the size of Spain), has a sizeable population 
(about 70 million) and is the fourth largest oil producer in the world (the second largest in 
OPEC). Its natural gas reserves account for 15% of the world‟s total – placing it second 
after Russia. It has a good education and health care system with abundant supplies of 
literate and technically trained personnel. Moreover, its rich culture and history as an 
ancient civilisation offer unique tourist attractions enhancing its potential as an important 
gateway between East and West. 
In this context, Iranian special zones offer a wide range of attractions to draw new 
businesses and FDI into the designated areas. Broadly, three sets of advantages on offer:  
 
(a) Streamlined business practices and special legal framework in the zones 
(b) Economic incentives and material attraction to entice investment; and 
(c) Geographic advantages associated with the choice of location where investment is 
channelled to.  
The most common legal advantages of the zones are to do with streamlined bureaucracy 
and business friendly rules and regulations adopted (such as labour laws, investment 
protection, foreign exchange and banking regulations, etc). Examples of these in Iran‟s 
FTZs are:  
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 Joint ventures with no limit on investment and shareholding (100% foreign 
ownership is allowed) 
 Full protection and guarantees offered to foreign investment  
 No currency restrictions  
 100% repatriation of capital and profit to other Iranian Free Zones or to other 
countries 
 Sale/lease of lands for Iranians and lease facilities for non-Iranians  
 Streamlined bureaucracy including setting up business and company registration  
 No entry visa requirement for foreign nationals 
 Simplified employment and labour regulations in the zone.  
 
A more detailed discussion of these and a comparison of rules for FTZs and SEZs is 
offered in Section 4 below.   
 
The main policy incentives on offer in the zones are: 
 
 15 years‟ tax exemption for operators within the FTZ (this does not apply to 
SEZs) 
 Duty exemption for raw materials and machinery imported for production and 
manufacturing in the Zone 
 No taxes on re-exports and exported goods from the Zones to the mainland 
 Provision of competitive infrastructure facilities and ancillary services.   
 
With increased global competition and the proliferation of free zones around the world, 
however, special provisions and incentives of this type tend to weaken in a comparative 
context and lose their comparative edge. As similar packages and facilities become 
available elsewhere and given that investment is by nature a competitive process, 
locational and geographic considerations are of critical importance to the ultimate success 
of free zones.  
As mentioned above, Iran‟s free zones are selected for their location within the country at 
large but also their links with other regions including neighbouring countries. This is 
especially true of the FTZs given their expected role in promoting exports. 
As we have seen, all six Free Trade Zones have either direct access to Iran‟s international 
waterways or have common international borders. For instance, Kish and Qeshm Islands 
are strategically located in the Persian Gulf. Chahbahar is with direct access to the Sea of 
Oman and Anzali is on the Caspian Sea. Similarly, the Aras FTZ borders the Caucasus 
region and Arvand is neighbours to Iraq and Kuwait. Apart from their location, all FTZs 
have good access to major air, sea and land transportation routes at the local, regional, 
and international levels. This puts them in proximity to regional markets, which 
facilitates importation of raw materials and intermediate or manufactured goods and 
provides easy access to local and neighbouring markets – principally those of the CIS and 
Central Asia in the North and the Persian Gulf and the GCC states in the South (the so-
called North South route). From an East-West perspective too, Iran is on the old Silk 
Road and various free zones can potentially play a role in this trade in this direction. 
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The Special Economic Zones are similarly interspersed throughout the country with a 
consideration for their linkages with major centres of economic activity within Iran or 
with neighbouring countries.  For instance, Payam, Salafchegan, Shiraz, Yazd,  Arg-e 
Jadid (they are near Tehran, Qom, Shiraz, Yazd, Kerman, respectively), and several 
others are at or near southern ports (Bushehr, Petrochemical SEZ,  Bandar Rajaee, Keshti 
Sazi Khaleej, etc; see Annex B for more detail). 
All these zones provide public investment in infrastructure and utilities and services. 
They boast good availability of skilled and semi- skilled manpower and highlight 
abundance of energy such as crude oil and natural gas. Several also have appropriate 
climates and drawing from Iran‟s fantastic historical heritage, can offer major tourist 
attractions, too. 
Despite these advantages, as we shall see below, attracting FDI into these zones has 
proven a considerable challenge in the first decade or so since the inception of the free 
zones.  
  
 
4. GOVERNANCE AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
4.1 Governance 
FTZs and SEZs in Iran have markedly different governance structures.  Governance 
matters pertaining to the Free Trade Zones are defined by “The Law on the 
Administration of Free Trade-Industrial Zones”. As we saw above, this law was first 
passed in 1993 under the auspices of the First Five Year Development Plan and was 
subsequently amended in 1999. It comprises 28 Articles and 8 Notes, covering all aspects 
of the operation, management and governance in the zones.
10
 
According to this law, all plans for the establishment of new zones and their boundaries 
will be subject to proposal by the government and have to be ratified by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. Moreover, under powers delegated by the Board of Ministers, 
each Zone is administered by an Authority organized as a company, with an autonomous 
legal status, whose capital shall belong to the government.
11
  Management is through a 
Board of Directors, which consists of three to five persons appointed by the Board of 
Ministers. The Managing Director, who is also ex officio chairman of the Board, is 
appointed by the President from amongst the members of the Board of Directors and is 
the highest executive authority in the economic affairs and infrastructure in the Zone. 
Furthermore to facilitate the coordination of the zones‟ activities, a High Council was 
established. This Council is chaired by the President and its membership is made up of 
various Ministers and the Secretary of the High Council of Free Trade–Industrial Zones.12 
                                                 
10 Details available from: See http://pw3.freezones.ir/law02.html.  
11  “The Authority and its affiliates and subsidiaries shall be exempt from the laws and regulations governing state-owned companies and from other general 
regulations decreed by the government… these companies shall be subject to the Commercial Code” (Article 5). 
12 Membership is as follows: Ministers for Economic Affairs and Finance, Commerce, Interior, Labour and Social Affairs, Industries and Mines, Roads and 
Transportation, Petroleum, Energy, Housing and Urban development, Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Head of Management and Plan Organization, the Governor 
of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, head of the Environment Protection Organization and the Secretary of the High Council of Free Trade–Industrial 
Zones. 
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The Council in turn has a Secretariat, which is administered by the Secretary, who is 
appointed by President of the Republic. 
Critically, perhaps, the Board of Ministers has under Article 138 of the Constitution, 
delegated all powers for the management of the zones to the Secretariat. This means that 
at least in the case of the FTZ, clear guidelines and legal powers exit which stipulate rules 
and regulations for their operations and management. Article 27 clearly enshrines the 
executive powers of relevant departments to the chairpersons and managing directors of 
the Free Zones. This means that both in principle and in practice the heads, chiefs and the 
acting directors of all government departments in the zone are appointed with the joint 
recommendation of the Chairperson and Managing Director of the Free Zone and 
ordinance of the highest official of the relevant government executive department. This is 
deemed necessary to avoid inconsistencies and conflicts between different departments 
and the management of the zones. 
This is quite different from the operation of the Special Economic Zones, which were set 
up and are managed under different circumstances.  Until 2005, these zones were 
governed according to Article 25 of the Second Five Year Development Plan (1994-99). 
In 2005, The Expediency Council intermediated between the Majlis and the Guardian 
Council to finalise the set of rules for these zones commonly known as “The Law on the 
Establishment and Administration of Special Economic Zones in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran”. This law comprises 25 Articles and 12 Notes and covers all aspects of the 
operation, management and governance in the zones.
13
 
As we shall see, there are several similarities between these rules and those for the FTZs. 
However, one of the main differences relates to governance and administration rules. 
Whereas, the FTZ rules entrust clear executive powers to the High Council for the 
running and management of the zones, the establishment and operation of SEZs is not 
subject to a clear cut and universal template. First, Article 3 stipulates that – subject to the 
approval of the Board of Ministers – the administration of SEZs is open to both state and 
non-state entities (FTZs can only be administered by state bodies). In fact, the special 
zones in Sirjan and Arg-e Jadid fall in this category. Second, their administration is 
decentralised in the sense that (unless in cases where specified), each zone is subject to 
the constitution and rules pertaining to the (public or non-public) body which is in charge 
of the zone. In practice, this means executive powers are vested in the authority which in 
charge (for instance, for the Petrochemical SEZ, that would be with the parent 
organisation which is National Petrochemicals Company, and so on). In practice, of 
course this means the multiplicity of decision making bodies in charge and one corollary 
of this is that for each zone their budget is determined at the local level (i.e. within the 
resources set by the parent organisation) rather than centrally by the Secretariat 
Authority. 
 
  
                                                 
13 A Farsi version of the Law is available from; http://www.freezones.ir/docs/regulation/ftz4.pdf  
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4.2 The Legal Framework  
The “Law on the Administration of Free Trade-Industrial Zones” mentioned above offers 
a raft of other business friendly rules and regulations for enterprises operating in the 
zones. These include full protection and guarantees offered to foreign investment. For 
instance, joint ventures are allowed with no limit on investment. Thus it possible to set up 
a wholly owned foreign enterprise in the zones, although in the SEZs, there is a limit to 
foreign ownership of 49%. Furthermore, in the FTZs:  
 
 There are no currency restrictions  
 It is possible to repatriate 100% of capital and profit to other Iranian Free Zones 
or to other countries 
 Non-Iranians can lease land (Iranian can buy and sell or lease of land)  
 Setting up business and company registration is streamlined and bureaucracy is 
simplified  
 Foreign nationals do not require to obtain entry visa clearance (entry visas can be 
obtained at the point of entry) 
 There are special employment and labour regulations (more of this below). 
 
There are several similarities between the FTZs rules and those governing the special 
zones. Chief among them: 
 
 Goods produced in both zones are exempt from customs duties when exported to 
the main land.  
 Goods in transit are also exempt from customs duties in both zones.  
 Both zones benefit from complete freedom of entry and exit for capital (including 
foreign capital). 
 In both zones, land can only be leased to foreigners (Iranians can buy and/or 
lease). 
 Special labour and employment laws apply in both zones (see below). 
 Employing foreign labour is allowed in both zones (subject to a 10% limit of the 
workforce in the enterprise). 
 
There are, however, a number of differences too. The main points being: 
 There is a 15-year tax exemption for business in the FTZs. SEZ enterprises are, 
however, subject to Iran‟s general tax rules. 
 In SEZs, foreign nationals are subject to the same visa entry requirements as in 
the mainland (there is no such entry visa requirement in FTZs). 
 In FTZs, both Iranians and foreign nationals can engage in retail transactions; in 
SEZs, however, only foreigners are allowed this facility. 
 There is no limit for foreign ownership in FTZs; in SEZs, a ceiling of 49% applies 
for joint ventures. 
 Off-Shore banking facilities (including free exchange rates) are available in FTZs; 
in SEZs, only domestic banking services (including exchange regulations) of state 
banks apply. 
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 No retail selling is allowed in SEZs (these are allowed only in Kish, Qeshm and 
Chahbahar but forbidden in the new FTZs in Arvand, Aras and Anzali). 
 
In general, FTZs have a longer history, are subject to clearer governance and 
administration rules and structures, and benefit from more business friendly legal and 
economic environments (see Annex C for more detail).  
A good case in point is the employment and labour laws that are applied in the FTZs. The 
so-called “Regulations of Employment of Human Resources, Insurance and Social 
Security in the Free Trade – Industrial Zone” are generally more flexible and less 
detailed than Iran‟s Labour Code which is notoriously more prescriptive, especially with 
regards to its provision for suspension or termination of employment contract; 
remuneration; or working conditions for vulnerable groups, such as women and youth.  
Table 5 offers a detailed comparison of the FTZ Labour Regulations with the provisions 
of the Labour Code in Iran. In general, the “Regulations” provide for more flexible work 
arrangements based on individualised labour contracts, and less generous entitlements, 
such as annual leave, overtime bonuses, or welfare benefits in the zones compared to the 
mainland. Moreover, these rules cover vaguely issues such as occupational safety and 
health; provision of training or employment of foreign citizens; and do not cover issues 
such as workers‟ and employers‟ organizations (but focusing largely on individual labour 
relationships); collective bargaining and agreements; or workers‟ welfare services. 
Perhaps most characteristically is the FTZs‟ Labour Regulations‟ in respect of the 
flexibility they allow for termination of an employment contract. While such termination 
is only allowed under six highly specific conditions under the Labour Code (such as 
resignation, death, total incapacity, retirement, etc.), the Regulations additionally allow 
for the cancellation of a contract by „the employer and the employee in cases stipulated in 
the employment contract in accordance with this decree‟ (Article 12). In practice, this 
allows employers to stipulate grounds for termination due to changes in economic, 
technological and organizational climate as long as these are clearly stipulated in the 
contract and agreed by the employee.  In principle, therefore, the notion of labour market 
flexibility – judged by hire and fire – is more attainable in the zones than in the mainland. 
However, in practice, whether the dismissal of a worker is acceptable (if disputed) is 
subject to the judgment of the Board of Settlement of Disputes.
14
  
 
                                                 
14 In case it is not judged acceptable, the employer shall have an option of reinstatement of the worker and paying him/her the forgone salary and wages, or paying a 
compensation of 45 days of salary for each year of his/her service (Article 34). See http://www.freezones.ir/docs/regulation/ftz13.pdf for a Farsi version of the 
“Regulations of Employment of Human Resources, Insurance and Social Security in the Free Trade – Industrial Zone”. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Iran’s Labour Code with the Employment Regulations in the FTZs 
 
Characteristic Labour Code Zone Regulations 
Fixed term contracts Allowed but the maximum duration determined by the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
No such limit. 
Resolution of labour 
disputes 
Through a tripartite Board of Inquiry. Through the Board of Settlement of Disputes in relevant 
Zones. 
Termination of 
employment 
Limited to six events: (i) the worker‟s death: (ii) the 
worker‟s retirement; (iii) the worker‟s total disability; (iv) 
the expiry of a fixed term contract; (v) the completion of 
work under a contract concluded for a specified assignment; 
and (vi) the worker‟s resignation. 
Same list plus an additional conditionality: the 
cancellation of the employment contract by the 
employer and the employee in cases stipulated in the 
employment contract in accordance with the Decree.  
Severance payment in 
case of contract 
termination 
Quite generous (for example, in case of termination on 
grounds of total disability or retirement, as well as of the 
completion of a fixed term contract, the worker to be paid an 
amount equal to the last monthly wage for each year of 
completed service (and two monthly wages for each year of 
service if the disability is work related).  
 
Negotiated individually. However, whenever the 
dismissal of the worker is judged acceptable by the 
Board of Settlement of Disputes, the Board shall 
confirm his/her dismissal and shall obligate the 
employer to pay (15) days of salary to the employee for 
each year of his/her service (e.g., not more than half of 
the severance in other parts of the country).   
Probationary period Not more than one month for unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers, and three months for skilled workers. 
Same. 
Hours of work Limited to 8 hours per day but overtime is allowed so that 
total hours of work should not exceed 44 hours in any week.  
 
Limited to 176 hours in four successive weeks (or 44 
hours on average per week) but the parties are free to 
negotiate the actual working hours per each day or week 
within the total limits. 
Overtime wage premium  40 percent of the standard hourly wage.  Up to the parties to agree on the premium. 
Working hours Daily: 6.00 am – 10 pm  
Night shift: 10 pm – 6.00 am.  
Same. 
Annual leave One month including four Fridays. A total of 20 days (including Fridays).  
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Characteristic Labour Code Zone Regulations 
 
Minimum wage Set centrally by the High Labour Council. Shall not be less than the minimum legal wages in Iran. 
Recruitment of foreign 
citizens 
Allowed subject to work permit. Same, but foreign workers not to exceed 10 percent of 
total employment population in each zone. 
Welfare benefits Relevant services and certain benefits and bonuses (such as 
annual bonus to workers) are established centrally. 
 
The Authority of the Free Zone will establish funds 
independently or jointly with the Social Security 
Organization and/or insurance companies for relevant 
benefits and services. 
Worker organisations No independent unions recognised or allowed. However 
collective labour negotiations and contracts allowed under 
certain conditions. Moreover, provision for worker 
organisations in the form of „Islamic Societies‟. The by-
laws, functions, powers and mode of operation of these must 
be formulated by the Ministries of Interior, and Labour and 
Social Affairs, and the Islamic 
Propagation Organization, and approved by the Council of 
Ministers 
Workers‟ and Employers‟ organisations not covered 
(focusing largely on individual labour relationships). 
General Far more prescriptive and detailed as far as suspension or 
termination of employment contract; remuneration; or 
working conditions for vulnerable groups, such as women 
and youth.  
 
Only vaguely covers occupational safety and health; 
provision of training or employment of foreign citizens; 
and does not cover issues such as collective bargaining 
and agreements; or workers‟ welfare services.  
 
Source: Based on World Bank analysis. 
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5. TRACK RECORD  
A full assessment of the net benefit of free zones in general requires a study of their 
main benefits and costs. It is customary to break down the former into static and 
dynamic benefits (FIAS, 2006: 17). These are: 
 
Static benefits: 
 Direct employment and income creation 
 Export growth and diversification  
 Foreign exchange earnings 
 Foreign direct investment 
 Government revenues. 
 
Dynamic benefits: 
 Indirect employment creation 
 Skills upgrading 
 Female employment 
 Technology transfer  
 „Demonstration effect‟ due to application of best practice 
 Regional development and regeneration.  
 
In general, it is easier to measure the static benefits, although the dynamic benefits 
may be much more important in the long term.  
 
On the costs side, we should also take into account the incremental financial and 
economic costs. These consist of: 
 Salaries of government employees in the zone authority 
 Other operating costs of the authority 
 Infrastructure development outlays 
 Tax income forgone from the domestic firms relocating from the domestic 
customs to the zone. 
 
It has been observed that a government‟s costs associated with the development of the 
zone are those that are incremental, i.e. additional costs not otherwise entailed (and 
not recovered through service charges and assessments; FIAS, 2006: 17). 
Evidence on Iran‟s FTZs and SEZs is very limited. In the case of the special zones, 
this is at least partly explained by the fact that they are relatively new creations and 
therefore their track record is still very limited. Although some of the early Free Trade 
Zones, as we have seen, have a relatively longer history, in their case too, 
unfortunately, there is serious paucity of data. Only Kish Free Zone Organisation 
publishes some (highly) selective quantitative information on certain aspects of the 
economics operation of the zone.  
The analysis that follows is therefore highly selective in respect of some of the above 
benefits. We first look at some general indicators for Kish, Qeshm and Chahbahar for 
which there is some data available for the period 1993-2004 followed by a discussion 
of Kish as a case in point. 
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Tables 6-8 provide data on three key aspects associated with the static benefits of free 
zones mentioned above: trade and contribution to exports, FDI and employment 
creation.  
Table 6 shows the total value of imports and exports from these three zones in the first 
seven years of their establishment (1993-2000) followed by the next four years to 
2001. We can see a huge disparity between the zones‟ imports and exports volumes. 
During the early years, imports outstripped exports by a staggering imports/exports 
ratio of 44:1. Although the gap has declined to 10:1 in more recent years, it is clear 
that the zones have a long way to go to boost exports and foreign exchange earnings. 
Otherwise, their success will be limited to acting as platforms for meeting Iran‟s 
appetite for consumer goods imports rather than as export platforms.  
Moreover, there is significant disparity in the experience of these three early zones, 
too. In the case of Chahbahar, exports are virtually non-existent. In the case of Qeshm 
Island, it is reported that in 1998, imports amounted to $480 million, whereas its 
exports earnings were a paltry $1 million only. Moreover, out of the 145 registered 
companies on the Island, only a handful could be considered as engaged in export 
business of any sort (Hedayati-Zadeh, 2007). Even if we combine the all exports from 
Kish and Qeshm Islands, the total falls short of 1% of Iran‟s non-oil exports altogether 
($5.6 billion on average for 2000-04).   
 
 
Table 6: Imports and Exports – Iran's FTZs, 1993-2004  
(million $) 
Kish Qeshm Chabahar Total
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
1993-2000 2,494      56.9
2001 136.6 4 247.8 9.5 100 0.06 484.4 13.6
2002 135.2 3 445.3 11.5 102.3 0.3 682.8 14.8
2003 82 4 194.5 114 73.8 0.2 350.3 118.2
2004 68.2 6.3 162.4 40.5 105.3 0.2 335.9 47.0
2001-04 422 17.3 1050 175.5 381.4 0.76 1,853.4   193.6   
Source: Gozaresh-e Amalkard-e Manategh-e Azad (A Report on the Performance of the FTZs),
 Secretariat of the High Council of The Free Trade-Industrial Zones, Tehran, 1380 and 1383.
  
 
Table 7 gives the volumes and trends for domestic and foreign investment in these 
three zones. It can be seen that despite an increasing trend in recent years, overall 
foreign investment has remained very modest: amounting to a total of $2.8 billion 
only in all the three zones combined over more than a decade since their inception 
(1993-2004). The lion‟s share has gone to Kish (just under 60%), followed by Qeshm 
(just under 40%) with only 2% going to Chahbahar.  Similarly, domestic investment 
has risen over these years with Kish accounting for more than four-fifth of all 
investment (81%), followed by Qeshm (14.3%) giving again a modest performance by 
Chahbahar (less than 5%). 
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Table 4: Domestic and Foreign Investment in Iran FTZs, 1993-2004 
 Kish   Qeshm    Chahbahar      Total 
 Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic  Foreign Domestic 
 (m $) (Bn Rls) (m $) (Bn Rls) (m $) (Bn Rls)  (m $) (Bn Rls) 
1993  4.31  116.5    0 120.8 
1994  26 0.33 109.6    0.3 135.6 
1995  116 2.6 83.2  5.1  2.6 204.3 
1996 29.3 305 43.75 57  68.7  73.1 430.7 
1997 130 335 61.7 183.6  75.97  191.7 594.6 
1998 118 172 100 276.6  134  218 582.6 
1999 120 253 142 330.6 1 114  263 697.6 
2000 115 312 125 478.75 1 10.7  241 801.5 
2001 218 2553 160 585 0.3 5  378.3 3143.0 
2002 315 3398 143 600 1.2 4  459.2 4002.0 
2003 302 7649 217 649 1.2 109  520.2 8407.0 
2004 300 8296 100 670 53.5 838  453.5 9804.0 
Total 
 
1647.3 
 
23419.31 
 
1095.38 
 
4139.85 
 
58.2 
 
1364.47 
  
     
2,800.9 
  
     
28,923.6 
  
(% of 
Total) 58.8 81.0 39.1 14.3 2.1 4.7  100 100 
 
Source: „Gozaresh-e Amalkard-e Manategh-e Azad‟ (A Report on the Performance of the FTZs), Secretariat of 
the High Council of the Free Trade-Industrial Zones, Tehran, 1380 and 1383. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Annual Employment in Iran's FTZs, 1993-2001,  
('000 persons) 
 Kish Qeshm Chahbahar  Total 
 
 
% 
Change  
% 
Change  
% 
Change 
  % 
Change 
1993 1.2  1     2.2  
1994 3 150% 5.4 440% 0.5   8.9 305% 
1995 5 67% 7.7 43% 1.7 240%  14.4 62% 
1996 7.4 48% 14.2 84% 3 76%  24.6 71% 
1997 7.6 3% 18.8 32% 4.5 50%  30.9 26% 
1998 8.7 14% 21 12% 5.5 22%  35.2 14% 
1999 9.1 5% 22 5% 7 27%  38.1 8% 
2000 9.4 3% 24 9% 8 14%  41.4 9% 
2001 10.5 12% 26.5 10% 8.5 6%  45.5 10% 
 
Source: „Gozaresh-e Amalkard-e Manategh-e Azad‟ (A Report on the Performance of the FTZs), Secretariat of 
the High Council of the Free Trade-Industrial Zones, Tehran, 1380 and 1383. 
 
 
Table 8 sheds light on employment creation in these three zones during their first nine 
years of operation (1993-2001). It can be seen that starting from very low bases, all 
three zones have experienced rapid growth in employment with Qeshm accounting for 
the largest workforce (reflecting the size of the Island). However, in absolute terms, 
the contribution of any one zone, or their combined effect, is very modest.  
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Table 9 shows private sector companies operating in this zone as of March 2008 by 
type of activity and number of employees. It can be seen that total employment 
amounts to a 1,144 employees only. Most are concentrated in small scale consumer 
goods industries with an average employment size of fewer than 25 persons. 
 
 
Table 9: Private Sector Employment in Chahbahar  
(as of March 2008)  
Electrical and Electronic 95 
Office Equipment and Computing 65 
Health & hygiene 28 
Pharmaceutical 44 
Textiles 15 
Packaging 229 
Chemicals 13 
Non-metallic minerals 32 
Sugar and confectionary 247 
Transport equipment 286 
Home appliances 15 
Pulp & paper 5 
Agriculture 70 
Total (persons) 1,144 
Average size 24.3 
Source: Chahbahar Free Zone, 
http://www.cfzo.com/index.php?parent_id=71&sub_id=71  
 
 
As stated above, unfortunately data limitations mean a more detailed assessment of 
the zones‟ track record is not possible at this stage. However, in the rest of this section 
we explore selective aspects of the development of the Kish Island for which there is 
relatively more data and information. 
Table 10 shows the demographic growth and expansion of the Island in the last half 
century since Iran‟s first census was conducted in 1956. It is clear that despite a quick 
growth spurt in the oil-boom days of the mid-1970s, the Island‟s population remained 
small throughout the 1980s. It was not until after it was officially established as a free 
zone in the mid-1990s that its population began to increase. According to Iran‟s latest 
census, there were some 20,000 inhabitants in the island in 2006 (up from nearly 
3,000 in 1986). This indicates that over the past decade, both population and the 
number of families living on the Island have trebled. Furthermore, the gender 
composition of the population is highly skewed with a 60:40 ratio males: females. 
This indicates the presence of a sizeable number of single, male internal migrants who 
are attracted to the zone in search of jobs (Table 10). 
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Table 10: The Population of Kish Island by Gender and  
No of Families (1956-2006) 
Date Population No of families 
 Men Women Total  
Nov 1956  377 383 760 * 
Nov 1966  457 428 885 * 
Nov 1976  3,916 1,676 5,592 * 
Oct 1986 1,473 1,358 2,858 * 
Oct 1996 5,148 2,274 7,422 1,818 
Nov 1997 9,688 2,959 12,647 2,953 
Dec 1998 11,087 4,139 15,226 3,883 
March 2000 11,133 5,368 16,501 4,454 
March 2004 13,767 7,998 21,765 6,316 
2006 12,381 8,541 20,922 6,168 
 
Source: Kish Free Zone Organisation, 
http://www.kish.ir/HomePage.aspx?TabID=4489&Site=DouranPortal&Lang=e
n-US  
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Air Passengers - Kish Island, 1998-2006 
Total No of Passengers  
(Arrivals and Departures) 
Year Internal External Total  % 
Change 
% 
External 
1998   1,227,307       60,162    1,287,469    4.7 
1999   1,089,182       81,340    1,170,522  -9.1 6.9 
2000   1,106,059    100,466    1,206,525  3.1 8.3 
2001   1,102,422    127,910    1,230,341  2.0 10.4 
2002   1,027,561    164,369    1,191,930  -3.1 13.8 
2003   1,094,084    174,904    1,268,988  6.5 13.8 
2004   1,117,926    229,847    1,347,773  6.2 17.1 
2005   1,273,048    338,513    1,611,561  19.6 21.0 
2006   1,500,304    480,984    1,981,288  22.9 24.3 
 
Source: Kish Free Zone Organisation, 
http://www.kish.ir/HomePage.aspx?TabID=4726&Site=DouranPortal&Lang=en-US  
 
 
Table 11 reflects the growing importance of Kish as an emerging centre for domestic 
trade and tourism. Data on air passengers travelling into and out of Kish are provided 
since 1998 both for domestic and external passengers. It can be seen that the Island 
has recorded steady growth with the number of external passengers especially on the 
rise. By 2006, a quarter of all air passenger traffic was attributable to these (up from 
about 5% in 1998). Furthermore, a study of the origins and destination of passengers 
in 2006 shows that about two-thirds of all domestic passengers were attributed to 
Tehran (68%), followed by Shiraz, Isfahan and Mashad ( each with 7-9% each). For 
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external passengers, Dubai was in a commanding position with 80% of all, followed 
by Sharjah (18%) and Abu Dhabi (2%). The growing volume of air passengers from 
the UAE indicates of course bristling business with the neighbouring UAE but also a 
growing number of Iranians living and working in these Gulf emirates who maintain 
business and family ties with those living on the opposite side of the Gulf. 
 
 
 
6. CHALLENGES  
As we have seen, for over a decade and a half now, Iran‟s free zones have sought to 
act as special havens for attracting capital investment and spearheading Iran‟s quest 
for economic diversification. Offering economic incentives and facilities – from 
infrastructure to special rules and a legal framework – the zones have aimed to entice 
domestic and foreign investors to create jobs and to promote Iran‟s non-oil exports. 
This has been in marked contrast to the approach in the mainland where the economy 
has continued to follow policies along an inward-looking, state-led track. 
Yet, the experience of free trade zones around the world indicates that the hallmark of 
success lies in their ability to exploit geographic and locational advantages with 
business friendly environments to attract and promote inward investment.  The latter 
in turn requires provision of economic incentives, a clear legal framework, 
streamlined bureaucracy and necessary infrastructure.  
Two factors, however, hamper an evaluation of the performance and impact of Iran‟s 
zones: the relatively recent history of many of them, and paucity of information for 
others, which do have a longer history.  
Some of the stated aims of the zones are clearly for the longer term and it is premature 
to assess these only on the basis of a few years‟ track record. This is especially true of 
the SEZs and the three more recent FTZs (Anzali, Arvand and Aras). However, the 
little data that is available for the earlier FTZs (Kish, Qeshm and Chahbahar) indicate 
limited ability to attract FDI, to promote exports and to contribute to job creation (see 
Section 6 above). 
Challenges facing Iran‟s free zones so far can be broadly attributed to two sets of 
factors: those emanating from the design and operation of the zones themselves, and 
those relating to the broader macro picture, namely  economic policies and the general 
business climate in the mainland, and growing regional competition. Below, we 
consider these briefly. 
Among micro level challenges – i.e. those relating to the zones themselves – are: lack 
of sufficient focus on and clarity of objectives, governance matters, and resourcing 
issues. 
As we have seen, even Kish Island, which is probably the most successful of Iran‟s 
FTZs, has strayed away from its original objectives of export promotion and jobs 
expansion as it came to emerge into more of a centre for domestic trade and tourism 
rather than as an export platform. One important reason behind this was early customs 
rules that – in a bid to draw in visitors and to increase the zone‟s attractiveness for 
business and commerce – allowed domestic travellers to the zones to take back 
(import) goods with them onshore according to Iran‟s general customs and excise 
regulations (these were treated as imports from abroad). Given that Iran had just 
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emerged from the consumer goods „hunger‟ of the war years in the late 1980s, and the 
higher costs of travelling abroad, the rule gave Kish an edge in its appeal to Iranian 
travellers keen to exploit commercial opportunities for purchasing foreign goods at 
competitive prices. Thus the Island encouraged mass tourism and trade, and was 
developed as a major conduit for imports of consumer goods.  This practice was, 
however, contrary to the original spirit of setting up FTZs as export platforms and was 
subsequently banned in 2003 when three new zones were set up (see Section 1 above). 
This example highlights the fact that although the choice of location for Iran‟s FTZs 
reflected their potential geographic value in terms of access to, and links with, larger 
markets beyond Iran‟s borders (CIS to the north and GCC in the south), they have 
some way to go to fully exploit their geographic advantages for promoting exports. 
There is no doubt that there has been some learning from the experience of the early 
zones too. In the case of more recent SEZs, for instance, they are spread out more 
widely throughout the country and with a view to their value in proximity to mainly 
domestic centres of growth and business. Moreover, their operations and management 
follow a more modern approach of allowing non-state entities to set up and administer 
new zones in designated areas. Despite this flexibility, the proliferation of such bodies 
can be confusing in practice and may indicate lack of a uniform approach to 
management and governance matters. In practice, in fact, there can be as many zone 
authorities as zones themselves with each Ministry or organisation in charge setting, 
and following, its own objectives and priorities.  
There are also resource implications. From a budgetary point of view, for instance, 
SEZs are subject to the budgetary considerations of their parent organisations or the 
authority which is in charge. Their own ability to raise revenue is limited to the sale of 
land and allocated budgets from those organisations. This can be a limiting factor 
during early development phases when the growth and expansion of infrastructure 
may necessitate a more strategic view of their development and a tighter timeline than 
may be feasible within the broader organisation they form part of.  
It would be wrong to ascribe all of the challenges faced by the zones to their design 
and operation matters only as the wider macro context in which they are situated in is 
also critical to their ability to attract inward investment and to their ultimate success. 
This requires an examination of their relationship with the mainland and an 
understanding of how competitive international business perceives the business 
climate more widely. This may be indeed where Iran‟s most serious challenges may 
lie.  
Despite Iran‟s undoubtedly promising potential as a major regional economy (see 
Section 3 above), its actual ability, or inclination, to attract inward foreign investment 
has been curtailed by two sets of factors in recent years – both working against the 
spirit with which free zones have been set up.  
It is broadly agreed that most successful zones capitalise on their links with the 
mainland (Madani, 1999).  This is, for instance, the case of successful free zones in 
China, Mauritius and the Philippines. On the contrary, in Iran free zones and mainland 
policies are mainly decoupled and pulling in different directions. Despite best efforts 
in the zones, therefore, their ability to attract investment is bound to be limited by 
adverse external perceptions of Iran as an investment destination and internal 
imperatives dispelling such investment. 
 26 
First and foremost, with the state dominating key aspects of the economy and 
bureaucracy and red tape affecting most aspects of public life, the economic climate 
has been far less than business friendly for most of the period since 1979. Moreover, 
Iran has pursued a largely isolationist course in the international economic arena 
which has proven inimical to foreign private investment. This has resulted in an 
overall weak investment climate in which Iranian and foreign investors alike have 
been wary of engaging in long term productive investment. 
Unfavourable domestic economic policies and business environment have been 
further aggravated by Iran‟s fraught international relations, which have meant the 
flow of FDI into Iran has been more of an uphill struggle during most of this period. 
Even before the recent nuclear stand off with the West, which has led to targeted 
sanctions against Iran‟s international interests, the US unilateral sanctions have, for 
over a decade since 1996, deterred foreign investors away from Iran. Although 
ostensibly levied against US companies and applicable to investments exceeding $40 
million in Iran‟s energy sector, this has undoubtedly raised the bar for international 
investors in general who have shied away from entering the Iranian markets in any 
significant way.  
Reflecting Iran‟s general difficulties with FDI, the free zones‟ task of appealing to 
foreign investors too has been challenging from the start. For instance, the 
government‟s pro-business policies in the zones risk lacking credibility given the 
glaring contradictions with policies in the mainland, which are beset by institutional 
ambiguities and are perceived as unwelcoming to foreign interests. The potential for 
flaring political and military conflict – even though lurching in the background – can 
further affect adversely the investment risk profile and pose an implicit cost in such 
investment decisions. 
This is reflected in Iran‟s business rankings worldwide which tells a generally 
unfavourable story overall. Table 12 gives the results of such rankings for 183 
countries based on 11 categories of business-related issues. It can be seen that Iran 
ranks 137 overall – well below its regional peers of Saudi Arabia (13), Bahrain (20), 
UAE (33), Qatar (39), Oman (65), Turkey (73), and Egypt (106), and not far from the 
West Bank and Gaza (139). 
 
Table 12: Iran’s International Business Rankings, 2010 
 
Rank Doing Business  
June 2008-May 2009 
Ease of Doing Business 137 
Starting a Business 48 
Dealing with Licences  141 
Employing Workers 137 
Registering Property 153 
Getting Credit 113 
Protecting Investors 165 
Paying Taxes 117 
Trading Across Borders 134 
Enforcing Contracts 53 
Closing a Business 109 
   
Source: Doing Business, Iran (2010).  
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Moreover, in seven of the 11 categories, Iran ranks in the bottom 40-50 (ease of doing 
business, dealing with licenses, employing workers, registering property, protecting 
investors, trading across borders, and closing a business). Only in two such aspects 
(starting a business, and enforcing contracts) does it make it into the top median. 
This point highlights the competitive nature of international business and especially 
growing competition within the region that Iran will no doubt continue to face in 
increasing measure. The success of smaller, resource-rich Gulf states (such as Dubai) 
with a clearly established lead no doubt raises the bar for late followers such as Iran 
and its emulating experience in the Kish Island. 
Overall, the growing importance of other regional economic powers such as Saudi 
Arabia, with a determination to initiate economic reforms and set up mega economic 
cities in recent years, as well as countries such as Turkey, with links to Europe and a 
longer track record of interaction with the international economy, pose tough 
competition for Iran. 
Unless Iran‟s mainland policies in relation to FDI and general economic reform can 
be streamlined and brought into line with those it aims to promote in the free zones, 
the latter‟s ability to succeed will be curtailed and the next decade too will be as much 
of an uphill struggle as the first one has already proven to be. 
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Annex A: Iran’s Free Trade-Industrial Zones 
Source: Iran‟s Free Trade-Industrial Secretariat website, http://www.freezones.ir/   
 
 Area Location 
 in Iran 
International 
Proximity 
Managing  
Director 
Phone Fax Website Email 
1 Kish  91 sq 
km 
Persian 
Gulf 
GCC states 
and Gulf 
waterways 
Majid 
Shayesteh 
+98 764 
4222841 
+98 764 
422581 
http://kish.ir/HomePage.aspx?Ta
bID=0&Site=DouranPortal&Lan
g=en-US  
info@kish.ir  
2 Qeshm 480 
sq km 
Strait of 
Hormuz 
GCC states 
and Gulf 
waterways  
Mohammad 
Asghari 
+98 763 
5227007 
+98 763 
5225595 
http://www.qeshm.ir/?Lang=en&
Page=00  
info@qeshm
.ir 
3 
Chahbahar 
140 
ha 
Southeast  GCC states 
and Oman Sea 
Mohammad 
Reza 
Bagherizade
h 
+98 545 
4442237 
+98 545 
444 2229 
www.cfzo.com  director@cfz
o.com 
4 Arvand 173 
sq km 
Southwest Iraq & Kuwait Ramazan 
Ahmadi 
+98 631 
333 4017 
+98 631 
333 1120 
http://arvandfreezone.ir/HomePa
ge.aspx?TabID=0&Site=Douran
Portal&Lang=en-US  
info@arvand
freezone.ir 
5 Aras 97 sq 
ha 
Northwest Azerbaijan, 
Armenia,  
Nakhchivan 
Abbas 
Ranjbar 
+98 492 
302 4949  
+98 492 
302 4766 
www.arasfz.ir  info@arasfz.
ir 
6 Anzali 3200 
ha 
North 
(Caspian 
Sea)   
Central Asian 
states, 
Caucasus and 
east Europe 
Kamal 
Firouzabadi 
+98 132 
4423004     
+98 132 
4423006    
http://www.anzali-fz.org/  firouzabadi
@anzali-
fz.org 
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Annex B: Iran’s Special Economic Zones 
SEZ 
(Year established) 
Area Location 
 in Iran 
International 
Links 
Special 
Theme 
Phone Fax Website 
1 Sirjan (1991) 1380 
ha. 
North of city 
of Sirjan  
300 km North 
of Bandar 
Abbas  
Multi-purpose +98 (0) 345 
347 3000 
+98 (0) 345 
347 2222 
www.sirjan.org 
 
2  Salafchegan 
(1997) 
2000 
Acres  
Near Qom 
(185 km from 
Tehran) 
No direct link  Multi-purpose +98 (0) 252 
367 7001-5 
+98 (0) 252 
367 7011 
www.qssez.com  
  
3 Sarakhs (1996) 5200 
ha 
Northeast (165 
km  from 
Mashad) 
Turkmenistan Multi-purpose +98 (0) 51 
1761 5065 
+98 (0) 51 
1761 5067 
www.sarakhsfz.org   
4 Petrochemical 
Special Economic 
Zone  
 
2000 
ha 
Southwest, 
(Mahshar a 
district of 
Bandar  
Khomeini) 
Persian Gulf 
shores 
Petro-
chemical 
+98 21 881 
0851-4 
+98 21 881 
0857 
www.nipc.net 
http://arvandfreezone.ir/HomePa
ge.aspx?TabID=0&Site=Douran
Portal&Lang=en-US  
5 Bandar Bushehr 9700 
ha 
Southwest 
(Bushehr port) 
Persian Gulf 
shores 
Shipping and 
Port facilities 
+98 771 
2522051-7 
+98 771 
2522051-7 
http://www.pso.ir/Portal/HomePa
ge.aspx?TabID=0&Site=Bushehr
&Lang=en-US 
6  Arg-e Jadid 
(1997) 
1100 
ha 
10 km from 
Bam 
No direct link Multi-purpose +98 (0) 346  
346 2291-5  
 
+98 (0) 346 
346 2944 
http://www.argejadid.ir/index.ph
p?id=-1  
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7  Iran Shipbuilding 
& Offshore 
Industries 
Complex CO 
(1999) 
2000 
ha 
South (near 
Bandar 
Abbass) 
Persian Gulf 
shores 
Energy 
intensive 
mining 
industries  
+98 (0) 763 
2223208 
+98 (0) 763 
2223220 
www.isoico.com 
 
8 Shaheed Rajaee 
Port (1999) 
20 sq 
km 
South Persian Gulf 
shores 
Shipping +98 (0) 761 
5564025  
+98 (0) 761 
5564063 
http://www.shahidrajaeeport.ir  
9 Bushehr (1998) 10,000 
ha 
South Persian Gulf 
shores 
Energy (gas, 
oil and 
petrochemical
s) 
+98 (0) 771 
5551611 
 
+98 (0) 761 
3549894  
www.bushehrfz.org  
10 Shiraz (2000) 300 ha Central (near 
Shiraz) 
-  Electrical and 
electronic  
+98 (0) 3 
227 3821 
+98 (0) 3 
227 3826 
http://www.seez.ir/indexEN.aspx  
11 AmirAbad Port 
(1997) 
60 ha North 
(Mazandaran) 
North-South 
(Sari-Bandar 
Abbas 
Port and 
shipping 
services 
+98 (0) 152 
546 2001 
+98 (0) 152 
546 2006 
http://www.pso.ir/Portal/HomePa
ge.aspx?TabID=3838&Site=Ami
rabad&Lang=en-US  
12 Payam 
(1992) 
3600 
ha 
50 km west of 
Tehran 
-  Air cargo, 
postal 
transportation
, storage and 
time sensitive 
goods 
+98 (0) 21 
886 8018 
+98 (0)21 
886 4900 
www.payamaviation.com 
13 Yazd Textile 
SEZ (2000) 
570 ha Central Iran -  Textile +98 (0) 351 
623 9701-4 
+98 (0) 351 
623 9700 
www.yazdtsez.com 
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Source: Iran‟s Free Trade-Industrial Secretariat website, http://www.freezones.ir/    
 
 
14 Keshti Sazi 
Khaleej Fars 
   Shipbuilding +98 (0) 21 
880 89901 
+98 (0) 21 
880 85511  
www.isoico.com 
 
15 Lorestan 71 ha Western Iran  -  Stones and 
quarry 
+98 (0661)  
322 9007 
+98 (0661)  
320 7758 
www.lorestaniec.com 
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Annex C: Comparison of Rules & Regulations in FTZs and SEZs 
 Description FTZ SEZ 
Similarities   
1 Import of goods from 
abroad into the Zone to be 
sold in the zone or re-
exported abroad, but not re-
imported to the mainland 
Free from all kinds of taxes and duties, but local levies 
and fees are collected according to the services rendered 
by the executive departments.  
Same.   
2 Re-exporting imported 
goods to the zone 
Free from all kinds of taxes and duties.   
 
Same.    
 
3 Warehousing in the Zone Available with no grace period for clearance of goods Same.   
4 Unloading, loading, transit 
and Transhipment of 
merchandises abroad 
Free from all kinds of taxes and 
duties, only warehousing and 
local charges shall be collected.   
 
Free from all kinds of taxes and 
duties, only warehousing and 
local charges shall be collected.    
 
5 Certificate of Origin Issued by the Zone Authority for the goods to be re-
exported partially, and or for value-added in the Zone.  
 
Issued by the S.E. Zone Authority for the goods to be 
re-exported partially, and or for value-added in the 
Zone. 
6 Utilization of land and 
natural reserves 
Land is sold and/or leased to the Iranian nationals, but 
only leased to the foreigners. 
Land is sold and/or leased to the Iranian nationals, but 
only leased to the foreigners. 
7 Protection of foreign capital 
investment 
Accepted, protected and guaranteed. 
 
Accepted, protected and guaranteed.  
 
8 Social security, social 
insurance 
The mainland social security regulations enforced. The mainland social security regulations enforced. 
 
9 Labour law, labour and 
industrial relations 
Subject to the regulations enforced in the Free Zones. Subject to the regulations enforced in the Free Zones. 
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 Description FTZ SEZ 
10 Employment of foreign 
personnel 
Up to the 10 % of the workforce employed in the 
enterprise. 
Up to the 10 % of the workforce employed in the 
enterprise.  
 
Differences   
1  Entry to the Zones No entry visa needed for the Zones (visa issued at the 
point of entry) 
 
Subject to the law concerning alien's entrance into 
the mainland.  
 
2 Registration of a company  Application must be submitted to the Free Zone 
authority.  
Application must be submitted to the S.E.Z. Authority. 
3 Foreign ownership Up to 100% of foreign capital investment. Up to 49% of foreign capital investment (subject to the 
law and regulations on foreign capital investment 
enforced in the mainland). 
4 Foreign Exchange rates Free market exchange rates in the Zone. Domestic banking exchange rates in the mainland.   
5 Certificate of Origin Issued by the Zone Authority for the goods to be re-
exported partially, and or for value-added in the Zone.  
 
Issued by the S.E. Zone Authority for the goods to be 
re-exported partially, and or for value-added in the 
Zone. 
6 Retail selling Allowed, except in the Arvand, Aras and Anzali Free 
Zones.  
 
Not allowed at all. 
7 Offshore banking services 
and operations by private 
sector  
Available in the free zones. Only domestic banking services operation by the state 
banks. 
8 Guaranteeing of foreign 
investments against 
nationalization and 
confiscation 
Shall be guaranteed by the Zone Authority, or the 
government, and approved by the Board of Ministers 
(depending on the sums involved). 
 
Subject to the “Law on the attraction  and protection of 
foreign investments”.  
 
Source: Based on information provided by the FTZ Authority; see website: http://pw3.freezones.ir/law00.html  
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